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This study was originally made for the International Prisoners Aid Association and conceived as a
pivotal point to which various national studies could later be related. The whole activity of the Asso-
ciation was connected with the Human Rights Year 1968 sponsored by the United Nations.
Collateral consequences flowing from criminal judgments are legion in the great majority of con-
temporary legal systems. Views regarding removal of these consequences widely differ. It is safe to say
that there is little conscious policy behind legal provisions dealing with this problem. At
least some of these provisions are not in harmony with modem correctional thinking; a few are ob-
viously relics of a distant penological past. This study proposes to present a panoramic view of areas
in which consequences of conviction usually attach. Different techniques of their removal are also
reviewed. The resulting view of the whole is offered as a basis for rethinking some aspects of the law
in this rather neglected area.
The number of adverse consequences flowing
from criminal judgments is very large in most
countries of the world. The relevant provisions
are scattered all over the body of law, so much so
that they are almost untraceable. It is safe to say
that even judges are often unaware of all collateral
effects their decisions entail. Views on the de-
sirability of removal of these adverse effects, as
well as techniques of removal, differ widely,
sometimes even within a single country. America,
with its highly complex legal system in which
laws emanating from different historical periods
can be found in disconcerting symbiosis, is as good
an example as any.
In the light of our professed changing attitudes
toward criminals, laws dealing with adverse
effects of convictions and their removal must be
subject to re-evaluation. The present study pro-
ceeds on the assumption that in doing so an
orientative comparative study may be rather
helpful. The tracing and cataloguing of various
disabilities that shackle convicts in contemporary
societies can provide a useful point of reference;
a survey of removal techniques may offer a list of
available alternatives. In order to serve as a
contrast to the American reader, the present
study will focus on foreign law. However in view
of limited information available, no attempt shall
be made at selecting a truly representative sample
of foreign jurisdictions.' Nor shall we be concerned
with the adverse social consequences occasioned
by criminal judgments. By social consequences
we mean those that do not attach by virtue of a
legal norm, but rather on account of societal
disapprobation (ostracism, refusal to employ, etc.).
The line between social and legal consequences is
somewhat tenuous. Some disqualifications and
disabilities may be contained in regulations of
1 In the preparation of the present survey, extensive
information was available on the following jurisdictions:
Canada, France, Greece, Israel, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, West Germany and Yugoslavia.
In respect to Argentina, Columbia, Denmark, Egypt,
England, Ethiopia, Italy, Japan, Russia, South Korea
and Spain, sources of information were more limited.
However, provisions contained in the penal codes of
these countries were considered and available com-
mentaries were consulted. Most useful were national
reports presented by some countries to the VIIth In-
ternational Congress on Criminal Law held in Athens
in 1957.
On a number of points, references shall be made to a
much greater number of countries. Information re-
garding Russia is largely valid for all other constituent
republics of the Soviet Union. The Russian criminal
law is mainly patterned upon the so-called Fundamen-
tals of the criminal legislation passed by the federal
parliament (Supreme Soviet) in 1958, which served as a
legislative model for all states of the Union.
The "status juris" for some countries is quite up to
date; for others it goes back a number of years.
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non-governmental bodies and a persuasive argu-
ment may be made that such regulations belong
to the "globus normativus", or formalized body of
law. However, the inclusion of these non-govern-
mental restrictions would render our subject
matter almost boundless, and in the interest of
expediency we will not deal with them.
Neither should all legal consequences emanating
from governmental sources concern us here. Our
interest will be centered on those consequences
which shackle the convict in his social relation-
ships in the community. It is here that we find a
number of restrictions which may be inconsistent
with modem correctional policy and criminal law
thinking, and thus worth investigating. Typically
these restrictions come into play after the sentence
has been served and the person is released from
the institution, although sometimes adverse legal
consequences flow from a criminal judgment even
if no prison term is imposed.
In keeping with this outlined general limitation,
we will exclude from our survey adverse conse-
quences necessarily incident to property punish-
ments (fines), corporeal punishments, and punish-
ments consisting of imprisonment,2 as well as the
indemnification of the victim, conversion of fine
into prison terms, and assessment of costs of
proceedings. Included, however, will be those
restrictions of freedom which are independent of
traditional punishments and outlast their execution
(e.g., police surveillance, expulsion from the
country, etc.).
This brings us to a variety of restrictions
imposed in connection with probation and parole.
Although their study is of interest to persons
concerned with the life of convicts in the com-
munity, these restrictions cannot be discussed in a
comparative survey of this scope because they
are closely linked with various and intricate
systems, and very often depend on the nature of a
particular offense. Moreover, they are substitutes
for traditional punishment and do not outlast the
execution of the sentence. Also we will exclude
from the present study those indirect legal con-
sequences resulting from the commission by the
former offender of a new offense (e.g., adjudication
as habitual offender, aggravation of punishment,
etc.).
The problem of criminal registration, however,
2 Thus we will not discuss limitations of behavior and
freedom of action imposed by the administration in
penal institutions.
will be considered. True, the entry of a conviction
in the criminal record is in itself not an adverse
legal consequence of criminal judgments. But, if
information from the record is readily accessible,
the entry into it may be the source of various
difficulties that the former convict encounters in
society.,
A special problem arises from the fact that the
concept of criminal offense varies from country to
country--some types of conduct that fall within
the purview of the criminal law in America are
considered in other countries as administrative,
non-criminal offenses. If a prostitute, for example,
is fined by an administrative official in a given
European country and banned from a locality, is
the banishment an adverse consequence flowing
therefrom? Whenever information is available,
we shall consider adverse consequences flowing
from conviction of punishable conduct, irrespective
of whether it is classified as criminal or non-
criminal by a given legal order.
CLASSIFICATION OF LEGAL RESTRICTIONS
SURVEYED
Even with the described limitations of the
subject matter, the adverse consequences flowing
from conviction are still quite numerous and
heterogeneous. Their orderly presentation calls for
some kind of classification.
(a) Classification of restrictions incident to
conviction may be predicated on their legal origins
or, in other words, on the nature of the legal
norm providing the restriction. While a trend
seems to be discernible toward limiting the power
of regulation in this area, the fact still remains
that a great number of governmental bodies and
agencies may regulate consequences of conviction.
4
A disqualification may be spelled out in a con-
stitution, code or statute, but it may also be
contained in a variety of delegated legislation
(decrees, ordinances, licensing regulations, etc.).
Such a classificatory scheme can and has been
used in dealing with one jurisdiction, but it is not
acceptable for a comparative survey. Too much
3 American readers may think that the omission of
records of arrest is due solely to the fact we are con-
cerned with consequences of conviction. However, there
is an additional reason. That a record of arrest should
be given any significance whatsoever is virtually un-
thinkable in most legal systems outside the United
States.4E.g., the Yugoslav Criminal Code provides that
consequences flowing from the criminal judgment may
be provided only by statute, and most of them by federal
statute (art. 37a). See also the Model Penal Code of
the American Law Institute, Official Draft, art. 306.1.
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-depends on the lawmaker's- whim; for instance,
the revocation of a driver's license may be pro-
vided by the code in .one country, by statute in
-another, and by an ordinance in still another.
(b) Some adverse legal consequences attach to
any judgment of conviction, others presuppose
conviction of specific offenses, while still a third
group result from the imposition of particular
punishments. 5 This distinction depends too much
on national idiosyncrasies and should be rejected
in a comparative survey.
(c) Some legal restrictions are imposed by
statute and arise by operation of law; these are
"consequences of conviction" in the strict sense,
not contained in the judgment itself (e.g., impedi-
ment to naturalization). Others require a judicial
or administrative decision, which may be dis-
cretionary or mandatory. Some of the latter
disabilities are labeled "punishments", either
principal, complementary or accessory.6 Finally,
some disabilities are characterized as "nonpenal"
security measure, 7 sanctions involving no blame
but a mere reaction against a dangerous situation.
They may be retroactively imposed and recog-
nized and enforced in other countries.
These distinctions provide an insight into the
various degrees of flexibility in imposing disabili-
ties on convicts, but they are not suitable as a
classificatory criterion in a comparative study.
The same adverse effect of conviction would have
to appear under different headings depending
upon the more or less arbitrary decision of the
lawmaker. Suffice it to illustrate the point by just
one example. Under West German law, loss of a
given office may be either a "consequence" of
certain punishments (§31 West German Penal
Code, hereinafter cited as P.C.), or an "accessory
penalty" (§35 German P.C.); and under the
Yugoslav law, it is a security measure (art. 61b,
Yugoslav P.C.), or a "consequence" of conviction
Cases exist in which certain disqualifications result
from judgments of acquittal. See Kunter, Les Con-
stquences Posiives Direcles ou Suppl~mentaires des
Tugements Repressifs Europ~es, REVoE ITRNA-
TIONAix DE DROIT PANAL 108 (1965). (Hereinafter
quoted as RIDP.)
6"Principal" punishment may be imposed inde-
pendently of any other; "complementary" may be
imposed by the judge only in conjuction with another
penalty; and, "accessory" may flow imperatively from
the infliction of certain other punishments. This civilian
distinction is sometimes a source of confusion. See
STEPANI & LEVASSEuR, Dnorr PNAL GNaAR- 317,
Paris (2nd ed., Tome I, 1966).
On the civilian concept of non-penal criminal law
sanctions, see Silving, Rules of Law in Crininal Juslke,
in EssAys ni CRnawAL SCIENCE 113-119 (1964).
(art. 37a, Yugoslav P.C.). This classificatory
scheme, therefore, should be rejected.
(d) It is tempting to classify adverse conse-
quences according to the motive which prompted
the lawmaker to attach them to criminal judg-
ments. As will be seen later, some legal restric-
tions are obviously prompted by the desire to
stigmatize and degrade the convicted person.
Others may be considered as a reaction to a
danger emanating from the offense or the offender,
or as relating to some other public interest.
However, determining a lawmaker's often complex
motive is in many instances not more than guess-
work. There may also be a discrepancy between
the original purpose of a legal restriction and its
actual use in practice. The present survey, in
providing an "inventory" of various legal dis-
abilities resulting from conviction, can only hope
to provide the groundwork for possible further
complex studies of the motivation problem.
(e) In certain civil law jurisdictions, one
encounters the tripartite classification of some
adverse effects engendered by conviction: loss of
political, civic and civil rights. The classification is
not all-encompassing and some effects of conviction
cannot be reduced to loss of rights. Moreover,
terms such as "political rights", "civic rights",
and "civil rights" have very little meaning to
common law lawyers; their meanings are clear to
Frenchmen whose Civil Code clearly distinguishes
between nationality, which confers "civil rights",
and citizenship, which confers political rights.
(f) For want of a more suitable criterion of
classification, we shall organize various adverse
effects of conviction into groups as follows:
1. citizenship and political activity
2. military matters
3. restrictions of freedom
4. standing in the community
5. public office, profession and other occupations
and employments
6. participation in the administration of justice
7. activities independent of employment
8. property, contracts, inheritance, family and
law-suits.
TMROINOLOGICAL DiT CThEs
As is often the case in comparative legal-studies,
the terminological difficulties are very great. Not
only does legal parlance greatly differ as we go
from the civil law to the common law system, but
also in countries belonging to the same system.
1968]
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Identical or similar adverse consequences of
conviction can sometimes be found behind widely
different labels. This is particularly the case with
many punishments. Very treacherous is the
reverse situation-false homonyms. A good
illustration may be the different meaning of the
terms "civil service" or "profession" in various
countries. By far the greatest problem stems from
the fact that it is often very difficult to establish
the precise reach of legal concepts. For example,
disqualification from holding "public office"
often figures among the adverse consequences
resulting from conviction, but the penumbra of
the concept "public office" is unusually large
even in a single jurisdiction. The problems are
compounded if we compare "public office" as
understood, for example, by the Germans with
that of the English.
Confronted with these difficulties, we shall
adopt the following approach. Whenever possible
non-technical, neutral concepts will be used and
will serve as a common denominator. Thus, for
instance, we will disregard often complex classifi-
cations of offenses in different countries and
loosely speak of serious and less serious offenses.
This of course, while enabling rough comparisons,
will somewhat decrease the precision of our
description. Therefore, conclusions may safely be
drawn from our study only so far as the firm core
of concepts is concerned. This brings us to various
caveats and disclaimers.
CAVEATS AND DIscLA=IxRs
There are few countries of the world in which
we can find comprehensive surveys of conse-
quences of conviction, particularly in the area of
licensing and regulation. What bedevils the
problem is that studies in different countries are
of various degrees of breadth, and consequently
the volume of information varies greatly.8 This,
of course, may be a source of erroneous conclu-
sions. The fact that a given country has pooled all
legal restrictions in a single piece of legislation, or
undertaken a rather comprehensive study of the
problem and made a rich catalogue of disabilities
resulting from convictions, may hastily be taken
to mean that this particular country shackles the
former convict with the largest number of legal
restrictions.
8 An illustration in point are various reports on the
problem of disabilities resulting from conviction pre-
sented to the VIIth Congress of the International
Association of Criminal Law (Athens, 1957).
The scarcity or absence of legal restrictions
found in certain areas in some countries should
not ipso facto be taken to mean that the former
convict encounters no legal obstacles put in the
area by the government. Rather than expressly
mentioning convicts in disqualificatory provisions,
the government may rely on broad formulas.9
Another reason may be that what in one country
may be obtained as a matter of right, is in another
a matter of discretion. If, for instance, in country
X the issuance of certain documents is a matter of
right, the express exclusion of former convicts
may be required; if in country Y issuance of the
same document lies in the discretion of an agency,
no such exclusion need be spelled out. Finally, the
relative importance of law as a means of social
control differs as we go from country to country.
Common law lawyers may be surprised at the
paucity of decisional law in this study. Fully
developed systems of reporting do not exist in the
civil law orbit, so the court decision is a less
pronounced authority.
HMSTORICAL OUTLINE AND OVERVIW OF
PRESENT STATUS
Many contemporary adverse consequences
resulting from conviction have a very long history
and derive more or less directly from ancient
reactions to crime. Thus, a cursory outline of their
development seems to be in order.
Probably the earliest precursor of our present-
day disabilities resulting from conviction is the
ancient penalty of outlawry imposed for certain
heinous crimes. In Western civilization it can be
found early in Roman history (declaration to be
"sacer"), and among various Germanic tribes.
Outlawry, as known by at least some Germanic
tribes, implied the ousting of the offender from the
community and the deprivation of all rights.
The outlaw's children were considered as orphans,
and his wife a widow. Besides losing his family
rights, he also lost all his possessions and even
his right to life (if we can use that expression), for
anybody could kill him with impunity.30
9 The reader should bear this in mind in considering
various formulas used in defining divorce grounds or
ineligibility for the bench or the bar. The laws of some
countries may speak of "moral turpitude", others may
be more specific and expressly mention conviction of
crime.
10 See Lear, Treason in Roman and Germanic Law
95 et. seq. (1962); Von Bar, History of Continental
Criminal Law 39 (1916); Brissaud, A History of French
Private Law 883-84 (1912).
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In the mature days of the ancient Greek and
Roman civilizations, a more humane approach
toward disabilities flowing from convictions of
crime prevailed. The consequence of certain
heinous crimes, in old Athens, for example, was
the so-called "infamy". It entailed the loss of all
rights which enabled a citizen to influence public
affairs, such as the right to attend assemblies,
vote, make speeches and hold public offices. The
right to serve in the army, conceived as an honor
and a source of standing, was also forfeited, and
the persons declared infamous could not appear
in court.n
In the Roman republic, outlawry fell into
desuetude and was only exceptionally applied in
the form of proclaiming a person guilty of treason
as the enemy of the country. Infamy, similar in
consequences to that found in Athens, seems to
have been a widespread way of degrading citizens
convicted of certain crimes involving moral turpi-
tude. In the late days of the Empire, specific
disqualifications resembling contemporary ones
appeared: the court could pronounce forfeiture of
the right to carry on a trade, hold certain public
offices, etc. Exile, previously a means of escaping
punishment, now became a penalty. Some forms
of exile entailed loss of Roman citizenship, con-
fiscation and loss of hereditary rights.'2
The barbarian states of the dark ages, by
superimposition of the Roman "infamia" and the
measure of "excommunication" applied by the
Roman church over old Germanic practices,
produced a wealth of variously called forms of
outlawry. In some European laws, notably in the
early Italian Statutes, the old outlawry was
retained in all its vigor. Referring to the precursor
of present-day banishment ("bannitio"), these
statutes explicitly state that the "bannitus" could
be attacked by anybody with impunity. In some
other European laws, the outlaw retained at least
some rights."
"Civil death", in medieval continental countries,
was the mandatory legal consequence of death
sentences and sentences to imprisonment for life.
The only practically important consequence of
civil death in regard to those sentenced to death
was confiscation of property. As far as those
n See Tsitsouras, Les Consiquences Legales, Adininis-
tratives et Sociales de la Condenmzation .Pnale, 28 RIDP
384 (1957); Von Bar, op. cit. supra note 10, §1, note 7.
12 MOMMSEN, RozuscEms SxAm cT 996, 1004,
Leipzig (1899).
1Von Bar, op. cit. supra note 10, §39.
imprisoned for life were concerned, the idea was
to emulate the results natural death would produce,
e.g., succession would be opened. The "civilly
dead" could not transmit upon intestacy or by
will, or receive gifts. All family and political
rights were forfeited. However, as a result of
rudiments of compassion, some rights were left to
them: they were capable of entering into onerous
contracts, acquiring property for consideration,
etc.1
4
In England, the so-called "attainder" was the
mandatory consequence of the death sentence, as
well as certain instances of absconding from the
jurisdiction. Attainder entailed confiscation of
property and various disabilities known under the
label of "corruption of blood". Foremost among
them was the deprivation of all rights to inherit
by or through the attained person.
In some Continental countries, a less harsh
consequence, called "infamy", resulted from the
infliction of some degrading punishments such as
the pillory, flogging or the "iron collar". In
France, for instance, persons struck with infamy
were excluded from public office, disqualified
from testifying, and lost all hereditary rights.15
The European Middle Ages also developed a
great number of punishments whose only purpose
was to expose the convict to public shame and
ridicule. Old sources reveal that the "penologists"
of the times attributed a great deterrent value to
the loss of face in the community. Thus, convicts
were forced to ride on a donkey through the streets,
carry certain objects, etc 6 Even though these
degrading punishments (in the most direct sense
of the word) did not technically entail "infamy",
they seem to have been very effective in exposing
the convict and his family to ridicule and loss of
face. Such humiliating and disgraceful punish-
ments were retained in Europe much longer than
one might expect. Most countries abolished them
only around the middle of the 19th century,
although in others they remained on the books
until the last decade of the century. For example,
some degrading punishments ("carcan") were
abolished in France as late as 1894. Sweeping
disqualifications resulting from death and life
sentences were also retained very long. What
14 For details see P.mIOL & RWERT, 1 TiRA=Sx
ON Cnwm LAW, Part 2, no. 372-373, translated by the
Louisiana State Institute (1959).
15 See Brissaud, op. cit. supr, note 10 at 885.
16 For details: Von Bar, op. cit. supra note 10,
§38: footnote 22.
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made them particularly harsh was the fact that
they affected the convict's family as well.'
The Age of Enlightenment produced two
legal provisions predicated on the view that the
former convict, following execution of sentence,
should be reinstated in the plenitude of his rights
and capacities. This Phoenix-like restoration was
specifically provided in the 1786 Criminal Code
of Leopold of Tuscany17 and in the Code of the
Austrian Emperor Joseph II of 1787.18 These two
astonishing provisions were, of course, not based
on ideas of reclaiming the individual and re-
integrating him into society, but were the outcome
of legalistic views inspired by contractual thinking,
coupled with the idea of expiation. Upon execution
of the sentence, the offender was thought to have
"paid his debt" to society, and any legal disquali-
fications outlasting the execution of sentence
seemed unjust. Both Codes were, however, short
lived. Although the century witnessed an im-
portant movement toward less cruelty in dealing
with former convicts, even the French revolution,
notwithstanding some humane views toward
punishment, did not introduce changes in the
area which concerns us. For instance, even though
"civil death" does not appear in the revolutionary
laws of 1791, it was provided by a statute of 1793.
Provisions dealing with civil death reappeared in
the Napoleonic codification, 9 and were not
abolished until 1854. In the majority of German-
speaking countries, "civil death" was abolished
around the middle of the century (Bavaria in
1849), and "attainder" disappeared from English
law in 1870.20
Consequently, in contrast to America, Europe
entered the 20th century free of the anachronism
of "civil death". To say that the medieval idea of
civil death disappeared from the European scene
before the turn of this century should not be taken
to imply that similar sweeping disqualifications
were not retained in many European countries.
The only vestige of even more ancient reactions
to crime known to this author is due to the rev-
olutionary upheavals following the Russian
revolution. A criminal statute enacted during
Stalin's rule, dealing with the crime of "fleeing
the country for the purpose of going over to the
17ch. 57
n Art. 184
19 Art. 25, Civil Code; Art. 18, Penal Code.
20 However "outlawry" in cases of absconding from
jurisdiction was abolished in England only in 1938. On
this type of "outlawry", see Richards, Is Outlawry
Obsolete?, 18 LAw Q. REv. 297 (1902).
enemy", provided the sanction of "declaration to
be outside of the law". Imposed in absentia, this
sanction entailed confiscation of property and
execution within 24 hours of the moment the
outlaw's identity is established. This statute was
abolished following Stalin's death.n
In presenting the 20th century development of
the law dealing with adverse effects of conviction,
perhaps the best starting point is France. It was
the French law that directly or indirectly served
as a source of inspiration to a great number of
contemporary laws on the matter.
In regard to serious crime,2 "civil death" and
"infamy" were replaced by three measures of
disqualification, classified as punishments: a)
twofold incapacity to gratuitously acquire or transfer
propeity, b) legal incapacitation, and c) civic
degradation or loss of civil rihts. All these measures
are still positive law in France.
The statute of 1854 abolished "civil death" and
substituted twofold incapacity which attaches by
operation of law to all life sentences and continues
even if the life sentence is commuted. Twofold
incapacity includes the incapacity to receive gifts
or take by way of succession and the incapacity
to make a valid will or make donations. Obviously,
only the most objectionable disqualifications
contained in "civil death" were rejected.
Legal incapacityn attaches by operation of law
to prison sentences of a particularly serious type
(so-called "deprivatlve" and "infamous" punish-
ments) and deprives the prisoner, until his release
from the institution, of the exercise of the rights
to manage his estate. His status resembles closely
that of certified persons and a guardian is ap-
pointed for him.
Loss of civic rights ("degradation civique",24
successor to medieval "infamy") provides for a
mandatory and permanent loss of a package of
rights, privileges and capabilities. Because it
served as a prototype of a great number of rather
general, blanket disqualifications in other coun-
tries, usually called loss of "civil" rights, the
disqualifications included in this punishment
deserve to be presented in their entirety:
21 Compare CmXVADZE, SovETsKoE UGOLOVizoE
PRAvo (Soviet Criminal Law) 275 (Moscow, 1959).
21 At this point the reader should recall our discussion
of terminological difficulties, and our decision to dis-
regard technical classifications of crimes and punish-
ments in various legal systems.
2 Art 29, P.C.24Art 34, P.C.
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The loss of civil rights consists of:
1. the removal and exclusion of the convict
from all public functions, positions or offices;
2. the deprivation of the right to vote, to
elect and to be elected and, generally, of all
civil and political rights and of the right to
wear medals or decorations;
3. disqualification from being a court-
appointed expert, a witness to legal instru-
ments, rendering testimony, but not from
merely giving information;
4. disqualification from being a member of
the family council, a conservator-guardian,
a curator, a joint conservator-guardian or a
court-appointed guardian, except for his own
children and only with the approval of the
family;
5. prohibition to bear arms, to be a mem-
ber of the National Guard, to serve in the
French Armed Forces, to be a school principal,
to teach, or to have any position in a school as
a professor, teacher or school monitor.
In the area of less serious crime, a more flexible
technique was adopted. Article 42 of the Penal
Code contains a long list of "civic, civil and
family rights" which may be forfeited incident to
conviction, but the imposition of these disqualifi-
cations has been made optional and the idea of
blanket loss rejected. Here the judge can pick and
choose from the list of disqualifications. In short,
under this system, disqualifications, no longer
automatic and in a package, may now be related
to the crime, the criminal, and the public interest.
This bird's eye view of adverse effects flowing
from convictions in France is far from complete.
It leaves out a great many disabilities which will
all be taken up later in dealing with specifics. The
brief description is, however, sufficient for our
present purposes. It provides us with a rough
sketch of the by now "traditional" regime of
sweeping legal disabilities resulting from convic-
tions, which served as a basis of quite recent,
further development in some countries.
The "traditional" French regime, described
above, is still positive law in a great number of
countries. But the idea of depriving the convict
of his capacity to manage property and placing
him under guardianship has not found widespread
acceptance. The equivalents of the French legal
interdiction are mostly limited in Europe to
countries bordering on France, such as Belgium,
Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco and Spain.25 Outside
of Europe it appears, for instance, in the Egyptian
Penal Code.28 Thus, in contrast to America, it is
very rare to find suspension or loss of the right to
sue, to contract, to take or transfer property, etc.
But, the successor of "infamy", the accessory
punishment of loss of civil (sometimes called
"honorary") rights in its traditional form of
mandatory deprivation of a variety of rights,
privileges and capacities, has mushroomed and
found its way into a great number of legal systems.
The list of disqualifications, however, varies. In
some codes or statutes, it closely resembles the
French (e.g., Italy, Monaco). In others it is re-
stricted to political rights regarding participation
in public life. ("Civic" rather than "civil" in the
technical parlance of some civil law countries).
Details also vary (e.g., the permanent or temporary
nature of disqualifications), but the basic pattern
remains the same. Outside of France, yet in
Europe, the described sweeping and mandatory
disqualifications attached to certain sentences
will, for instance, be found in Austria, Belgium,
Greece, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Poland,
Norway, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland.n
Outside of Europe, they are known in Egypt and
countries which (like Chile) follow the Spanish or
Portuguese example.2
An early criticism of the traditional regime of
disabilities consisting in the loss of "civil rights"
was that the penalty was too inflexible. The
criticism did not apply in its full force to jurisdic-
tions like the Dutch or German where the imposi-
tion of the accessory penalty was not mandatory.2
But even there, or in countries like Argentina,
2
1Belgiunm (Code of 1867, art. 20-23); Italy (Code of
1931, art. 32) Luxembourg (Code of 1879, actually the
Belgian Code, art. 20-23); Monaco (Code of 1874, art.
19); Spain (Code of 1944, art. 43). It is also inserted in
the Civil Code of Greece (art. 1700). It is interesting to
note that the legal incapacity also known to the old
Spanish Code of 1870 and applicable in the Philippines,
caused the U.S. Supreme Court to familiarize itself with
the penalty. See Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349. See also
note 27 infra and the respective text.
26 Art. 25
21 Austria (Code of 1852, art. 26); Belgihn (Code of
1867, art. 31); Greece (Code of 1950, art. 59 et seq.);
Lichtenstein (Code of 1859, art. 26); Luxembourg (Code
of 1879, art. 31); Monaco (Code of 1874, art. 35);
Portugal (Code of 1886, art. 76); Poland (Code of 1932-
still in effect-art. 45, 47); Spain (Code of 1944, art,
34, 52); Switzerland (Federal Code, art. 52); Norway
(Code of 1901 until 1953).
28 Egypt (art. 25); Chile (Code of 1875, art. 27 et seq.)
29 Germany (Code of 1871, §32); Holland (Code of
1881, art. 28); Yugoslavia (until 1959).
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Colombia or South Korea,30 the regime was inflexible
in the sense of failing to provide for the possibility
of "dismembering" the long list of disqualifications,
and imposing only some of them.
Further development is closely linked to the
new criminological thinking with its strong
emphasis on reintegration of the offender into
society as a means of preventing recidivism.
Proponents of this approach came to view many
adverse effects resulting from criminal convictions
as either unnecessary and irrational, or harmful
and inhumane legal barriers. Often they can
prevent normal life in a community, impede
efforts at rehabilitation and be instrumental in
causing relapse into crime.
The punishments of loss of civil rights and
legal incapacity came under sharp attack. There
is little doubt that the motive behind their inflic-
tion is that of degrading the offender. Occasionally
even terminology testifies to it, e.g., German
"Ehrenstrafen". Disqualification of former con-
victs should never be motivated by degradation.
It is justified only if it is in some way related to a
public interest such as a concern for the authority
of and respect for certain offices, prevention of
recidivism, etc. Relation to public interest cannot
be established unless each disqualification is
individually considered and its imposition left to
the discretion of the judge. Some disqualifications
contained in the punishments of loss of civil rights
were declared as objectionable on principle (e.g.,
testimonial incapacity). Some critics went so far
as to argue that even the label "punishment"
should be discarded and another label expressive
of nonpunitive nature be adopted.
This orientation ran into opposition in some
quarters. A considerable body of opinion considered
degrading punishments as useful because fear of
disgrace in the eyes of the community has a greater
deterrent value than the fear of suffering involved
in traditional punishments. Yet, there is no doubt
that the views of opponents of the disqualifications
motivated solely by the desire to degrade now
prevail among criminologists and lawyers. This
was reflected in the final acts of the Seventh
International Congress of Criminal Law held in
Athens in 1957. Although a result of compromise,
it still contains the following passage: "... . all
legal consequences of conviction motivated by the
3OArgenlina (art. 19); Colombia (art. 56); South
Korea (Code of 1953, art. 43).
sole goal of degradation should be abolished." 31
Legal interdiction and loss of civil rights are
specifically mentioned.
Equally significant is the recent development in
another direction. The great inflation of regulatory
activity in our century produced a colossal number
of statutes, decrees, regulations and ordinances
providing for various adverse "side-effects" of
convictions. As will later be seen, some appear in
areas one would never expect. However, the
process of rehabilitation of the offender requires
a thought-out policy. Obviously the latter cannot
be implemented if numerous legal restrictions,
many unknown to the judge, shackle the ex-
convict. Hence, the strong feeling in many quarters
that there should be a general overhaul of the
whole body of law, notably that dealing with
licensing and regulatory restrictions. The view
seems to be gaining ground that the powers of
regulating restrictions incident to conviction
should either be centralized or at least the activity
of various authorized bodies and agencies co-
ordinated. Some of these views found their way
into the final acts of the VIIth International
Congress of Criminal Law as well."
2
These recent developments were not limited to
specialists in the field of criminal law and crim-
inology. Echoes of new views reached the legal
systems of some countries. The most timid step,
taken by countries which retained the punishment
of loss of civil rights, was empowering the sentenc-
ing judge to impose only those disqualifications
from the list which seem warranted in a particular
case. "Public interest" is sometimes explicitly
mentioned. This is the case, e.g., with the Nor-
wegian Penal Code' s as amended in 1953, and the
modern Code of Ethiopia (1957).14 A similar
technique can be found in the Italian Penal Code'5
of 1930, and the Russian Code of 1922,36 abrogated
in 1960.
Some countries went further and abolished this
type of punishment altogether, while retaining a
number of disabilities in their codes, usually
dealing with occupational disqualifications. The
Soviet Union abolished the punishment of loss of
civil rights by a repeal statute in 1958, and there
is no such penalty in the new Russian Criminal
1The full text of the resolution may be found in 29
RIDP 229 et seq. (1957).
3Id. at 237.






Code of 1960. Yugoslavia abolished the punish-
ment in the amendments to the Criminal Code
passed in 1959. These two countries thus joined
the group of countries that never adopted the
sweeping disqualifications contained in the loss of
civil rights (e.g., England, Canada, Israel, Japan,
etc.). An unsuccessful attempt to abolish the
punishment was made in the Parliament of
Finland in 1948.
On the other end of the spectrum, from the
traditional approach to effects flowing from
conviction, are Sweden and Denmark. In 1936,
Sweden not only abolished the usual disqualifica-
tions such as the loss of electoral rights, testimonial
incapacity, but also the almost universal disability
to hold public positions, various occupational
disqualifications, etc. As a result, revocation of
driver licenses became one of the very few legal
consequences resulting from conviction.n The
changes seemed to have been successful in Swedish
circumstances, for the new Penal Code of Sweden
which went into effect in 1965 did not revert to
more traditional solutions." Denmark followed
the Swedish example in 1951.
The movement in national legislation has of
late been paralleled by an interesting development
in the international arena. In 1950, a number of
Western European countries signed the so-called
European Convention on Human Rights, securing
a long list of rights and privileges to individuals.
An enforcement machinery was also established
consisting of the European Commission on Human
Rights as well as the Court of Human Rights. In
keeping with the traditional view that the in-
dividual, the real party in interest, has no locus
standi under international law, individuals were
not accorded the right to directly reach the Court.
However, an optional clause signed by Belgium
and other countries provided for the right of
individuals to petition the Commission if they felt
their rights under the Convention were violated.
The Commission is then to study the matter and
if it finds merit in the case, refer the matter to the
Court. The signatories agreed to abide by the
judgment of the Court.
17 Problems regarding entry into the criminal records
and its effects will be discussed below. Consequences
other than legal are discussed in Simpson, Les Con-
stquences L6gales, Administratives and Sociales de la
Condemnation .Penale, 28 RIDP 349 (1957).
33 The new Code contains, however, the punishment
of "suspension of public servants." But, the period of
suspension can never exceed one year (P.C. Chapter 32,
section 2).
In 1960, a case was referred to the Court involv-
ing disabilities flowing from conviction under
Article 123 of the Belgian Penal Code of 1867
(incorporated in 1944):
Any person convicted of an offence or at-
tempted offence under Title I, Vol. 2, Chapter
II of the Penal Code or Articles 17 and 18
of the Military Penal Code, committed in time
of war, shall, ipso facto, be deprived for life
of the following rights:
(a) the rights set out in Article 31 of the
Penal Code, including the right to vote and the
right to be elected;
(b) the right to appear on any roll of bar-
risters, honorary counsel or probationary
barristers;
(c) the right to take part, in any capacity
whatsoever, in instruction provided by a
public or private establishment;
(d) the right to receive remuneration from
the State as a minister of religion;
(e) the right to have a proprietary interest
in, or to take part in any capacity whatsoever
in the administration, editing, printing or
distribution of a newspaper or any other
publication;
(f) the right to take part in organising or
managing any cultural, philanthropic or
sporting activity or any public entertainment;
(g) the right to have a proprietary interest
in, or to be associated with, the administration
or in any way with the activity of any under-
taking concerned with theatrical production,
films or broadcasting;
(h) the right to carry out the duties of
director or manager or authorised representa-
tive of a private company, limited share-
holding partnership, co-operative society or
credit union; the office of manager of a Belgian
establishment, under Article 198 (2) of the
consolidated Commercial Companies Acts; to
practise the professions of stockbroker,
broker's agent or bank auditor, the profession
of banker or director, governor, manager or
authorised representative of a bank as defined
in Royal Decree No. 185 of 9th July 1935, or
those of managers of Belgian branches of
foreign banks specified in Article 6 of Royal
Decree No. 185 of 9th July 1935;
(i) the right to be associated in any way
with the administration, management or
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direction of a professional association or a
non-profitmaking association;
(3) the right to be a leader of a political
association.
This long list of disabilities was applied in 1946
in the case of a Belgian journalist, de Becker,
convicted for collaboration with the Nazis. In
1951, following an act of clemency, de Becker was
released on parole on condition that he take
residence in France. Subsequently de Becker
asked the Belgian authorities on several occasions
to restore at least some of his rights and capacities
and approve of his residence in Belgium. All his
requests denied, he finally lodged a petition with
the Commission, alleging, inter alia, that the
imposed disabilities violated human rights as
spelled out in the European Convention. After a
somewhat lengthy procedure, the Commission
referred the case to the Court. In 1961, while the
case was still pending, the Belgian legislature
amended the controversial Article 123 in such a
way that de Becker lost interest in the litigation
and the proceedings came to an end in 1962.11
Although the representative of the Belgian
government vigorously refuted the idea that the
legislative changes were related to the proceedings
before the international bodies, the fact still
remains that probably for the first time in history
the question of sweeping disabilities flowing from
conviction was considered by an international
tribunal and its possible incompatibility with
human rights considered.
Only tangential to the subject-matter of this
study, but significant as evidence of the growing
concern of international bodies over the rights
of convicted persons, is yet another development.
In 1962, the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe passed a resolution on electoral, civil
and social rights of prisoners. In it, claiming to
express "European legal conscience", they urged
member Governments of the Council of Europe to
exercise great restraint in depriving prisoners of
their rights during the execution of sentence. Some
of the specific recommendations, notably those
dealing with capacity to sue and defend legal
actions, seem to be specially applicable to those
countries that still have the system of legal in-
9 See Affaire "de Becker", Publication de ]a cour
europ~enne des droits de l'homme, 154 et seq., 190,
Strasbourg (1962).
capacity and similar restrictions placed on con-
victs.
40
Thus, the historical trend in the development of
disabilities resulting from conviction seems to be
decidedly in the direction of increasingly fewer
legal restrictions on former convicts. The direction
of the future seems to be toward retaining only
those restrictions necessary for the safeguard of
some public interest. But, as the survey of specific
adverse effects of convictions will reveal, this trend
only holds promises.
VARIous CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION
(A Catalogue)
I
Consequences of Conviction Affecting
Citizenship & Political Rights
The consequences of conviction affecting citizen-
ship will be taken up first, because it is citizenship
which represents the basis upon which all political
rights are superimposed.4' Next we will deal with
the possible loss of political rights-those rights
which enable a person to participate in public
affairs.42 Consequently we will not only deal with
various electoral and voting disqualifications, but
also with various restrictions on the freedom of
public expression, freedom of assembly, etc.
A. Effects Regarding Citizenship:
Very few countries surveyed explicitly provide
that conviction of certain offenses entails loss of
citizenship. Until the reform years beginning in
1958, Soviet law contained an expatriation statute.
Included in all criminal codes of the constituent
republics was the measure of "designating the
convict as an enemy of the toilers", which implied
stripping of citizenship and even expulsion from
the country. This punishment was, however,
limited to the most serious offenses considered to
40 See Resolution (62)2 adopted by the Ministers'
Deputies on February 1, 1962, containing Recom-
mendation no. 195 on "Electoral, Civil and Social
Rights" of prisoners. These recommendations would
put an end to "legal" incapacity.
41The term "citizenship" is not used in the strict
technical meaning it often has in civil law legal litera-
ture, where it is opposed to "nationality". See 1
PLAMoL & RIPERT, T"AITL ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT
Crvim (12 ed.) Partie 2, Chapitre 3, §1, no. 425.
"We avoid speaking of participation in "political
life" and preferred the term "public affairs" because
some legal systems use disqualifications going beyond
the domain of political life proper.
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endanger the security of the state, and was hardly
ever used in practice; the new Soviet criminal
legislation contains no such expatriation statute.43
Some countries still explicitly provide for the
punishment of loss of nationality to others than
natural-born citizens. They apply only to persons
who acquired citizenship through naturalization
or some other legal device. This, for instance, is
the case under the French Code on Citizenship of
1945, which contains a provision whereby citizens,
other than natural-born, may forfeit their na-
tionality, inter alia, in case of conviction of an
offense against the "internal or external security
of the state." Similarly, by Spanish law," na-
turalized citizens convicted of some offenses of
treasonable nature and various offenses against
international law, may suffer loss of citizenship.
Treasonable conduct, coupled with failure to
return to the country and stand trial, may cause
a naturalized Canadian citizen to lose his citizen-
ship (Citizenship Act, as amended in 1958).
Perusal of various nationality laws reveals,
however, that the number of countries in which
the state has the power to strip convicts of their
citizenship may be much larger. Many nationality
laws, in speaking of grounds leading to the forfeit-
ure of nationality, use language so broad that
they obviously cover convictions of criminal
offenses. Analysis of all these laws falls, however,
outside of the scope of this study.
In this connection, it should perhaps be noted
that a few nationality laws explicitly prohibit
deprivation of citizenship following conviction of
a criminal offense. An example of this rare pro-
vision is the Yugoslav law on citizenship of 1945,
which allows the stripping of one's nationality
only if the citizen resides outside of the country,
damages his homeland, and acquires another
nationality; conviction of a criminal offense per se
will not suffice.
45
On the other side of the coin, conviction may
operate as a legal impediment to the acquisation
of citizenship by way of naturalization. If used
discriminately, this particular effect of conviction
appears understandable and justifiable. But, here
41 See CmIvADzE, op. cit. supra note 21, at p. 275.
44 Art. 34, Criminal Code.
45 Leaving aside other considerations, let us note only
one, often deplored, possible consequence of expatria-
tion laws. Unless the expatriated person has already
acquired another nationality, he becomes a stateless
person-a status most countries pledged to keep down
to a minimum. See the preamble to the 1930 Hague
Convention on Citizenship.
again; few countries expressly refer to conviction,
as an impediment to naturalization (France and
Norway). Most jurisdictions use broad formulas
in describing prerequisites to the granting of
naturalization, and such formulas, no doubt, cover
conviction of at least those offenses which involve
moral turpitude. An illustration in point is the
West German Statute on Federal and States'
Citizenship of 1913 (§18) which requires as a
prerequisite to naturalization, "blameless life".
Soviet law, in this area, is less restrictive than most
others in that it provides practically no impedi-
ments to naturalization usually inserted in con-
temporary nationality laws.
46
B. Effects Regarding the Right to Vote:
Although this disqualification is one of the most
commonly found in contemporary legal systems,
its scope is somewhat ambiguous. Most civil-law
(legislative) enactments simply refer to the loss
of the right to vote, without amplification. As a
rule, the disqualification is broadly construed so as
to encompass not only voting for electoral purposes
(parliamentary, municipal or local), but also
voting in, plebiscites, referenda and the like.
Marginally, with respect to voting in various
aspects of public life (school boards), the demarca-
tion line is not dear. In West Germany, the right to
vote is understood as relating only to the right to
elect; this disqualification howeve, is coupled with
another-"voting in matters ofr public concern"
(§34 West German P.C.). The clarity is somewhat
greater in countries like Canada, Greece and Israel,
which enacted specific electoral laws for different
elections and inserted disqualifications therein.
Loss of the right to vote is invariably found in
countries which still include the sweeping penalty
of loss of civil (civic or honorary) rights in their
catalogues of punishments. In most of these
countries, the disqualification attaches to certain
sentences either by operation of law, or as a result
of a mandatory decision on the part of the judge.0
Disenfranchisement sometimes attaches to
conviction of specific offenses, sometimes manda-
41 Compare LEPESEKi=, KURS SOVETSOGo Gosu-
DARSTVXNNOGO PRAvA 467 (Moscow, 1961).
VArgentina (art. 19, P.C.); Columbia (art. 56, P.C.);
Finland (chapter 2, art. 14, P.C.); France (art. 34,
P.C.); Greece (art. 63, P.C.); Luxembourg (art. 31,
P.C.); Monaco (art. 35, P.C.); Poland (art. 54, P.C.);
South Korea (art. 43, P.C.); Switzerland (art. 52, Fed-
eral Code) and West Germany (§32 P.C.). Automatic
disenfranchisement is also found in Canada (Crim.
Code, section 654(1)), although the punishment of loss
of civil rights does not exist there.
19681
MIRJTAN R. DAMASKA
torily, at other times in the discretion of the judge.
Thus, for instance, in Norway, the judge may
deprive the convict of the right to vote only upon
conviction of particular offenses and with the
further proviso that this disqualification be re-
quired in the public interest.43 Similar provisions
are found in the Ethiopian Penal Code. 9
In many countries, the disqualification from
voting is only temporary (unless, of course, the
life sentence is involved).5" In others, the dis-
qualification may often be permanent (e.g.,
France)." The disqualification takes effect on the
day the sentence becomes final, but the time spent
serving one's sentence does not count as part of
the period during which the disqualification is
imposed (e.g., Norway, Switzerland and West
Germany).
Some countries provide for loss of the right to
vote only while the convict is imprisoned. The
disqualification, in other words, does not outlive
the execution of the sentence. This limited dis-
qualification is found in Japan (unless the crime
involves electoral fraud), Spain,5 ' England (Forfeit-
ure Act of 1870), and various Canadian jurisdic-
tions (e.g., the Ontario Election Act). As will soon
appear, the practical consequences of this system
approach the one in countries which have dis-
carded all voting disqualifications.
The usual justification for the loss of the right to
vote as a consequence of conviction is that anti-
social elements should not partake in the political
life of a country. This raison d'etre of the disqualifi-
cation was challenged in Sweden as early as the
thirties. Although the weight of argument on this
matter depends on the particular circumstances of
a given country (such as the actual meaning and
importance of the right to vote), it still may be of
interest to briefly present the Swedish argument
against the voting disqualification. The mere desire
to attach legal stigma on a convict is in itself no
sufficient justification for voting disqualifications.
What other considerations may be used in its
support? The ratio of convicts to the total voting
populace is so negligible that convicts are not
likely to materially affect the outcome of elections.
On the other hand, voting disqualifications soon
become a matter of common knowledge (particu-
48 Art. 31, P.C.
49 Art. 122, P.C.
5o Holland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland
and West Germany.
5UArt. 34.5
2 Arts. 35, 37, 39 P.C.
larly in small townships and rural areas), the result
in reactions impeding the reintegration of the
former convict into the community. Following this
line of reasoning, the Swedes abolished voting
disqualifications as early as 1936; Denmark followed
in 1951.
Independently of this Scandinavian movement,
voting disqualifications were discarded by the
Soviets in 1958, and Yugoslavia in 1959. The
Yugoslav law, however, suspends the exercise of
voting rights of prisoners during the execution of
sentence." Of the countries surveyed, no voting
disqualifications exist in India and Israel.5'
C. Eflects Regarding the Right to be Elected:
As a rule, disqualification to be elected receives
treatment parallel to the disqualification to vote.
In fact, the "right to vote" in many civil law
countries is understood to include the so-called
"active" and "passive" right to vote, the latter
taken to mean the right to be elected. It is probably
only for purposes of clarity or perhaps because
"poenalia sunt restringenda", that statutes refer,
often redundantly, to the right to be elected besides
the right to vote. Consequently, what has been
said regarding the right to vote applies to the
present disqualification. The reader, however, may
be curious about the Swedish argument in support
of the former convict's right to be elected. While
it seems plausible that the convict in exercising
his right to vote will probably not affect political
life, the former convict elected to an office may.
Here, the Swedes rely on the voters. It seems very
likely, they say, that the former conviction will
become an issue during the campaign and the
voters will not be misinformed about the candidate.
If they nevertheless choose to elect him, it is felt
that the legislature should not interfere with their
choice."
The fact that in a few countries the former con-
m Art. 55a, P.C.
4A separate problem is the opportunity of prisoners
undergoing punishments in an institution to exercise
their right to vote. Many electoral laws require electors
to vote only at the polling place at which they are reg-
istered, and prisoners are excluded from voting unless
they can cast their ballot by proxy. To change this, the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe recom-
mended in 1962 that prisoners be afforded the oppor-
tunity to vote by whatever legal expedient seems ap-
propriate. See Resolution (64)2 on electoral, cival and
social rights of prisoners.
55 Compare Strahl, Les consequences de la condemna-
tion p~nale, Rapport General, Presente au VIIdme Con-
trgs International de Droit Pinal, 28 RIDP 573 (1957).
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vict suffers no electoral disqualifications should
not be taken to mean that he can be elected to
any office or position. While retaining his general
elective capacity, he may be shackled with various
occupational disqualifications.5 6
D. Disqu difications frmn Positions of Influence:
If political rights are taken to mean rights
enabling one to partake in the public life of the
country, then many occupational disqualifications
should concern us here. This is the case with the
disqualification to hold public office, found in
various forms in almost all countries. The concept
of public office is, of course, quite elusive and
differs from country to country. But, whatever the
meaning of public office, at least swne public
offices are considered distinctly political.
Other occupational disqualifications, such as
prohibition from managerial and leading positions
in the press and publishing activity, disqualifica-
tion from leading positions in the trade unions and
political parties,u are relevant here, but they are
inextricably bound up with various other occupa-
tional disqualifications, and their proper situs is
among them. Thus, we shall consider them later.
E. The Bar to Public Appearance:
The bar to public appearance imposed on a
convict may be motivated by political as well as
non-political reasons. The lawmaker, for instance,
may decide to attach such a disability as a con-
sequence of the abuse of mass media for obscene
purposes. However, because of the potential the
measure has in the way of preventing a person from
influencing public life in any way, we will deal
with this disability in the present context.
The bar to public appearance exists in Yugoslav
law, and consists of the prohibition from publishing
in the press, appearing on the radio and television,
or speaking at public gatherings. The bar can take
51 On this point, Swedish law is unique; as will appear
later, there are practically no occupational disqualifi-
cations in that country.
67 Such disqualifications can be found in the famous
article 123 of the Belgian Penal Code before its repeal
in the wake of the de Becker case. They also appear
among the numerous disqualifications entailed in the
so-called "national degradation" provided by a French
decree of 1944 for the crime of "national indignity".
For details see Donnedieu de Vabres, Traitd de droit
crimind et de l6gislation pdnale compareg 368, Paris
(1947).
two legal forms. It may be provided by statute as
a collateral consequence of certain convictions,53
and in that case takes effect by operation of law, 9
or it may be imposed upon conviction by the judge
if, in the court's opinion, public appearance has
been misused in committing a crime." Since the
disability imposed by the judge is classified not as
a penalty but rather as a security measure, it is
justified only as a means of preventing recidivism
and, in both its forms, is temporary.
F. Other Disabilities Affecting Political Rights:
Some jurisdictions limit the disabilities affecting
the convict's participation in political life to those
voting disqualifications and occupational restric-
tions specifically delineated by the legislator. In
addition to, or in place of, specific disabilities, other
jurisdictions have enacted a broad provision de-
priving the convict of all "political rights". Such a
sweeping formula has been found in the penal codes
of Italy,61 Portugal,62 West Germany,63 and, with a
slightly different wording, in Columbia.4 The scope
of this prohibitive formula is quite ambiguous and
the Commentaries, great repositories of law in
civil law countries, are unenlightening.65 No
illuminating cases arising under the relevant
provisions are known to this author. Many ques-
tions remain unanswered-probably in view of the
delicate nature of the subject. Can the convict
join or form a political party? Can he express his
views on political matters on any mass media, etc.?
The relationship of at least some of the imaginable
disqualifications to the constitutions of the re-
spective countries is not altogether clear.
ss Art. 37a, C.C.
9 It is interesting, however, to note that so far not a
single statute has provided this kind of disability and
it remains only a legislative possibility. This is not
surprising if the legislator's motive is revealed. The
legislative purpose of article 37a, providing many other
consequences of conviction besides the one we consider
here, was that of limiting the power to lay down dis-
abilities flowing from conviction. Before the amendment
adding art. 37a, disabilities were provided by a host of
bodies (municipal and local regulations, charters of
enterprises, etc.). Now, the legislator has the monopoly
in laying down collateral consequences of conviction.
60 Art. 61c. C.C.
01 Art. 28.
62 Arts. 60, 61.
Sec. 34.
6 Art. 42.65Compare, for instance, ScH6dim & SCHRdDER,
STRAGESETZBUCH (12th ed., Mtichen, Berlin, 1965).
Comment explanatory of §34.
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B. Forfeiture of Military Decorations:
Adverse Consequences with Respect
to Military Matters
A. Disqualification from Serving in the Armed
Forces:
This disqualification is conceived in two different
ways. In some countries, it is largely a holdover
from the times when being a soldier was basically
an honor rather than a duty. Consequently, the
disqualification is technically conceived as a
degrading punishment. This is the case under
French law in which the disqualification is in-
corporated in the larger punishment of "civic
degradation." 66 Whether this type of legal dis-
qualification is also experienced as a punishment
by the convict is, of course, another matter. It
seems very likely that some convicts consider this
restriction more of an advantage than an adverse
disability. Changing times have prompted the
French lawmaker to provide many exceptions to
the imposition of the disability which would other-
wise flow automatically from certain sentences.
Rather than being disqualified from serving, some
convicts are sent nowadays to special units."
Exceptions will also be found in West Germany
whose Statute on Military Duty of 1956 provides
dismissal from the army and disability from serving
as a consequence of certain convictions.
A modern approach to the present disqualifica-
tions is illustrated by the Penal Code of Norway."
Although labeled as a penalty, the disqualification
resembles a non-punitive, protective measure,
imposed only if it appears to the judge to be in the
public interest that a convict not serve in the
armed forces (e.g., disloyal persons convicted of
espionage, alcoholics, etc.).
In the codes of the surveyed countries, the dis-
qualification from serving in the armed forces has
also been found in Holland.69 It was discarded by
Sweden in 1936, by Greece in 1928; and it is not
found in the statutory law of the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia.
66 Art. 34, P.C.
67 See Statute of March 31, 1928, art. 3.
"Sec. 30.
69 Art. 28, P.C.
This is a widespread consequence resulting from
criminal judgments. "Loss of civic rights", in
countries which still have that punishment on the
books, often entails forfeiture of military decora-
tions 7 Sometimes the forfeiture of decorations is
coupled (as in Greece) with the disability to acquire
them in the future." In other countries, it is not
technically a punishment contained in the criminal
judgment, but rather a collateral consequence
flowing from conviction. Thus, under Yugoslav
law, certain sentences carry forfeiture of military
decorations by operation of law. However, decora-
tions for valor in time of war are forfeited only in
exceptional cases provided by statutey2 Important
limitations on the power of courts to take away
certain medals also exist in the Soviet Union."
Swedish law does not provide forfeiture of decora-
tions.
C. Forfeiture of Military Ranks:
As with decorations, the lowering or deprivation
of military ranks is in many countries involved in
the loss of civic rights. This is the case in Austria,
Belgium, Columbia and West Germany. The laws of
some countries provide only for the deprivation,
not the lowering, of military ranks.74 In others,
forfeiture of rank is coupled with the disability to
acquire it in the future.7 Sometimes forfeiture of
military rank is coupled with dismissal from the
armed forcesY.
In a great many countries, special military laws
provide for an elaborate public ceremony in the
course of which the soldier is stripped of his rank,
the purpose being to emphasize the degrading
nature of. the demotion.
(To be continued in next issue.)
70 Austria, Columbia, Egypt, France and Italy.
7 Art. 63, C.C.
2Art. 3, Yugoslav Statute on Decorations.
7Compare art. 36 of the Criminal Code of R.S.F.S.R.
,4 (England, Forfeiture Act of 1870, sec. 2; Poland,
art. 45, P.C.; various republics of the Soviet Union).
75Art. 31, Belgian C.C.
76 E.G. Art. 126, Ethiopian P.C.; art. 36, 38 of the
Swiss Military Penal Code.
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